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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel resilience im-
provement system for Java applications. The unique feature
of this system is to combine automated monitoring, automated
perturbation injection, and automated resilience improvement.
The latter is achieved thanks to the failure-oblivious computing,
a concept introduced in 2004 by Rinard and colleagues. We
design and implement the system as agents for the Java virtual
machine. We evaluate the system on two real-world applications:
a file transfer client and an email server. Our results show that
it is possible to automatically improve the resilience of Java
applications with respect to uncaught or mishandled exceptions.
Index Terms—fault injection, dynamic analysis, exception-
handling, software resilience
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern software, resilience capabilities are engineered
through error-handling code, in particular exception handling
code in managed languages such as Java and C#. This re-
silience capability is manually engineered by developers, who
write the error-handling code. For example, part of their coding
activity is to write try-catch blocks to handle exceptions. The
problem is that exception-handling code is notably hard to
write and to test [10]. As a result, there often exists corner-
cases where resilience is not provided by developer-written
code. In production, when those corner cases are activated,
the software system may simply stop providing its function
because it crashes after an unhandled exception [36].
In order to improve error handling, two kinds of techniques
are being researched: fault injection [24], [38] and failure-
oblivious computing [30]. Fault injection is about injecting
failures to trigger a system’s error handling code and to ana-
lyze the abnormal behaviour [32]. Failure-oblivious computing
is about adding fully generic error-handling code with auto-
mated code transformation [30]. In the context of exceptions,
failure-oblivious computing means automatically adding catch
blocks with a default exception-handling strategy [9]
In this paper, our goal is to automatically improve the
exception-handling code of software applications. This is made
by first finding weaknesses in resilience and then instrument-
ing the application with automated exception handling. To
achieve our goal of automatically improving resilience, we
design a novel system, called TRIPLEAGENT, made of three
components, called “agent” in this paper1. Those three agents,
automated monitoring, automated perturbation injection, and
automated failure-oblivious method validation [30] are orches-
trated by an agent controller. The controller analyzes all the
monitored data and reveals both weaknesses and suggested
improvements in the resilience capabilities.
To the best of our knowledge, TRIPLEAGENT is the first
system which actively injects exceptions during execution in
order to, after analysis, automatically detect failure-oblivious
methods.
We evaluate TRIPLEAGENT on two real-world Java applica-
tions. One is TTorrent, a file transfer client which implements
the BitTorrent protocol. The other one is HedWig, an email
server. In both cases, we consider a production workload:
respectively downloading a large file from the Internet, and
sending and receiving emails from the server. By apply-
ing TRIPLEAGENT, we observe that exceptions thrown from
257(21%) perturbation points do not lead to failures anymore,
which shows an automatic resilience improvement.
To sum up, our contributions are the following.
• The concept of joint usage of fault injection and failure-
oblivious code instrumentation to evaluate and improve
resilience against uncaught or mishandled exceptions. We
propose a corresponding novel algorithm for automatic
improvement of software resilience.
• A system called TRIPLEAGENT that combines moni-
toring, perturbation injection and failure-oblivious com-
puting in Java, implemented with agents for the Java
Virtual Machine. The system is publicly-available for
future research in this area at http://bit.ly/tripleagent-repo.
• An empirical evaluation of TRIPLEAGENT on two real-
world applications of 20.3K lines of code in total. By
performing 9968 fault injection experiments under a real-
istic, production-like workload, it shows TRIPLEAGENT’s
effectiveness for improving software resilience.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the background. Section III and Section IV present
the design and evaluation of TRIPLEAGENT. Section VI dis-
cusses the related work, and Section VII summarizes the
paper.
1Here, an agent refers to the Java terminology, where it is a component
that is attached to the Java Virtual Machine [14].
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II. BACKGROUND
TRIPLEAGENT is founded on techniques from the fault
injection and failure-oblivious computing [30]. This section
presents a basic introduction to the core concepts.
A. Fault Injection
Fault injection is a popular research topic in software
testing and dependability evaluation. Fault injection techniques
actively inject different kinds of errors into a target system
in order to assess its dependability [24], [32], [38]. This can
happen in several phases: 1) during unit testing, fault injection
generates more test cases so that corner cases are detected, and
the coverage of testing is improved. 2) during integration, fault
injection can trigger different failure scenarios so that devel-
opers gain more confidence in their system’s error-handling
design. 3) when done in production, fault injection is usually
called “chaos engineering” [2].
The kinds of failures that can be injected vary depending
on the considered dependability aspect. For example, injecting
processor errors or hardware-based errors is often done for
evaluating the dependability of operating systems [16], [25].
Injecting connection errors between different micro-services
supports to test a service’s retry logic and its robustness of
interacting with other services [6]. Injecting an exception in a
certain method is useful for validating an application’s error-
handling capability [37].
In this paper, we focus on fault injection in the context of
Java applications, which means rather high-level, application-
level fault injection.
B. Failure-oblivious Computing
In order to improve the resilience of an application, dif-
ferent techniques can be applied to prevent the application
from crashing when an error occurs [23]. Failure-oblivious
computing [30] is one of these approaches to overcome
software failures at runtime. The main idea of failure-oblivious
computing is to discard certain failures in a principled way.
For example, if a method tries to write data into an invalid
memory address, with failure-oblivious computing, the writing
operation would be ignored. It has been shown that failure-
oblivious computing is able to increase availability [9], [29],
[30], eg to serve requests to more users despite errors.
In this paper, we use the concept of failure-oblivious com-
puting for the Java programming language. In Java, there
is no invalid memory addresses, but the biggest reason for
crashing are exceptions thrown at runtime. Thus, we do failure-
oblivious computing for uncaught and mishandled exceptions.
III. DESIGN OF TRIPLEAGENT
This section presents the design of TRIPLEAGENT, includ-
ing relevant definitions, algorithms and its architecture.
A. Definitions
a) Exception: All major programming languages provide
a way to signal problems through so-called exceptions. In
some statically typed languages such as C# and Java, ex-
ceptions are typed, and some of them are statically verified
at compile-time (e.g., checked exceptions in Java). For these
checked exceptions, developers need to either handle them at
the call site or explicitly declare them in the method signature
(with the keyword throws in Java [15])
b) Perturbation point: In this paper, a “perturbation
point” is a unique location in code where a fault can be
injected. In TRIPLEAGENT, the considered perturbations are
injected exceptions, which means that a perturbation point is
defined as a statement that potentially throws an exception.
A perturbation point is noted < m, l, e >. m describes the
method where this point is located. l is the line number before
which the exception is thrown. e is the type of this exception.
c) Fault model: In this paper, we consider two fault
models: 1) injecting only one exception, when the perturbation
point is reached for the first time and 2) always injecting
exceptions when the perturbation point is reached.
d) Perturbation search space: We define the “perturba-
tion search space” as the Cartesian product of all possible
perturbation points and all fault models with respect to a
workload [8], [9]. The size of the search space is the number
of workload executions required to have an exhaustive picture
of the behavior under perturbation.
e) Exception handling method: When an exception e is
handled in a method, this method is called the “exception han-
dling method” for e. In a tuple <exception source, exception
type, method>, the source refers to the location where the
exception was thrown. In this paper, we make a distinction
between “default exception handling methods” and “failure-
oblivious method”: the former refers to methods with manually
written catch blocks while the latter refers to method with
automatically instrumented catch blocks.
f) Acceptability oracle: An acceptability oracle is a
mechanism for determining whether an application’s behaviour
remains acceptable under perturbation.
In order to evaluate and improve an application’s resilience,
we use oracles to describe acceptable behaviour, hence we
call them “acceptability oracle”. In this paper, an acceptability
oracle is a combination of generic oracles (like the absence of
crash) and domain-specific ones. For example, in the context
of a file downloading client, an acceptability oracle could be
that 1) the client does not crash and exits normally 2) the client
successfully downloads the file with a correct checksum.
g) Failure-oblivious method: A method fo is said to be
failure-oblivious with respect to a perturbation point p if and
only if: 1) when an exception is thrown from p, it is possible
to catch and stop its propagation in fo that is upper in the
call stack; 2) the behaviour of the application verifies the
acceptability oracle if the exception thrown from p is caught in
fo. This is noted < m, l, e > 7→ fo (here 7→ denotes “thrown
exception e in method m before location l and caught at fo”).
h) Fault injection experiment: Given an application a
and a workload w, injecting an exception during the execution
of a under w is called an “experiment”. TRIPLEAGENT is
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designed to conduct experiments in order to evaluate and
improve an application’s error-handling capability.
Example. Let us assume an invocation chain across three
methods: m2 → m1 → m0. Method m0 can throw an
IOException before line number l, and the developers write a
try-catch block to handle it in m2 (the method upper in the
stack). Consequently, m2 is the default exception handling
method for this exception. If the exception is caught and
silenced in method m1 and the application behaviour is still
acceptable according to the oracle, method m1 is considered
as a failure-oblivious method for < m0, l, IOException >.
B. Goals of TRIPLEAGENT
TRIPLEAGENT aims at improving the exception-handling
capabilities of Java applications. The main goals of
TRIPLEAGENT are: 1) to give developers feedback about
the effectiveness of their exception-handling design; 2) to
automatically identify improvements of exception handling.
The former is about detecting the weakness points of the
system under consideration and the latter is about finding
new failure-oblivious methods that improve the application’s
resilience.
Input to TRIPLEAGENT: TRIPLEAGENT takes arbitrary
software written in Java as input and a workload. No manual
change is required from the developer. Neither source code nor
test suite are required for improving an application’s resilience.
TRIPLEAGENT also takes as input an acceptability oracle,
which will be explained below in Section III-A.
Output for the developer: The output of TRIPLEAGENT
is a report for developers. The report gives three pieces of
information: 1) the perturbation points and their classification
as defined next; 2) the verified failure-oblivious methods, i.e.
the resilience improvements; 3) a log file which contains all
the monitored information for the purpose of further analysis.
TRIPLEAGENT classifies the perturbation points into three
categories as follows:
Definition 1. Fragile points: A fragile point is a statement in
a method before which injecting one exception results in the
application crashing or freezing.
Definition 2. Sensitive points: A sensitive point is a statement
in a method before which injecting one single exception
does not influence the application in the workload under
consideration. But, continuously injecting exceptions results
in the application to crash or freeze.
Definition 3. Immunized points: An immunized point is a
statement in a method before which no matter how many ex-
ceptions are injected, the application still behaves acceptably.
C. Core Algorithm
The whole procedure of TRIPLEAGENT to identify failure-
oblivious methods could be split into 3 steps:
1) Define acceptability oracles and detect perturbation
points. TRIPLEAGENT executes the application normally, in
order to monitor and record the application’s normal be-
haviour. With this execution, the perturbation agent goes
Algorithm 1 Detection of Perturbation Points
Input:
An application A;
A repeatable workload for this application W ;
Output:
P , a set of perturbation points;
1: Execute the application A normally under W ;
2: for each method m loaded into the JVM do
3: for each checked exception e thrown from m do
4: for each location l ∈ m do
5: P ← P ∪ {< m, l, e >};
6: end for
7: end for
8: end for
9: return P ;
Algorithm 2 Automated Classification of Perturbation Points
Input:
An application A;
A repeatable workload for this application W ;
A set of perturbation points P ;
An acceptability oracle O;
Output:
F a set of fragile points points;
S a set of sensitive points;
I a set of immunized points;
1: for each point < m, l, e >∈ P do
2: Execute the application under W ;
3: if m is executed for the first time then
4: Inject the exception e before location l;
5: b1← application behaviour;
6: end if
7: Execute the application under W ;
8: Always inject exceptions e before location l;
9: b2← application behaviour;
10: if b1 not meet O and b2 not meet O then
11: F ← F ∪ {< m, l, e >}
12: else if b1 meet O and b2 not meet O then
13: S ← S ∪ {< m, l, e >}
14: else if b1 meet O and b2 meet O then
15: I ← I ∪ {< m, l, e >}
16: end if
17: end for
18: return F, S, I;
through all classes loaded into JVM and locates every pertur-
bation point, based on method signature, which is described
in Algorithm 1.
2) Classify all the perturbation points into fragile, sensitive
or immunized ones (as defined in Section III-B). For each
perturbation point, TRIPLEAGENT conducts two experiments:
only injecting one exception when the point is reached for the
first time, and always injecting exceptions when the point is
reached. Based on the observation of the application behaviour
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Algorithm 3 Detection of Failure-oblivious Methods
Input:
An application A;
A repeatable workload for this application W ;
A set of perturbation points P ;
An acceptability oracle O;
Output:
A set of failure-oblivious methods R;
1: // Find candidate failure-oblivious methods to be assessed
2: Q← ∅ // Worklist for candidate methods;
3: for each point < m, l, e >∈ P do
4: Execute the application under W ;
5: if m is executed for the first time then
6: Inject the exception e before location l;
7: for each method n in the call stack do
8: Q← Q ∪ {< m, l, e > 7→ n};
9: end for
10: end if
11: end for
12:
13: // Assess all candidate failure-oblivious methods
14: for each perturbation point < m, l, e >∈ P do
15: for < m, l, e > 7→ n ∈ Q do
16: Execute the application under W twice as specified
in Algorithm 2;
17: When e is thrown, catch the exception e in n;
18: if the behaviour meets O then
19: R← R ∪ (< m, l, e > 7→ n);
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: return R;
under perturbation, the perturbation point is classified using
Algorithm 2.
3) Identify candidate failure-oblivious methods and evaluate
each of them as described in Algorithm 3. TRIPLEAGENT
detects candidate failure-oblivious methods with call stack
analysis: every method in the stack before the default handling
method is identified as a candidate failure-oblivious method.
Then two fault injection experiments are conducted (only
inject one exception, inject several exceptions). The difference
is that all the thrown exceptions are caught in a catch block
instrumented in candidate failure-oblivious methods. By ana-
lyzing the behavior once the exception is caught in this catch
block, TRIPLEAGENT confirms whether the method under
evaluation is indeed failure-oblivious or not.
D. Architecture of TRIPLEAGENT
Figure 1 shows the general architecture of TRIPLEAGENT.
TRIPLEAGENT considers a Java application in a JVM, such
as a backend web application or a Java micro-service.
When an application is loaded into the JVM, TRIPLEAGENT
attaches to it three different agents: a monitoring agent, a
perturbation agent and a failure-oblivious agent. The mon-
itoring agent is responsible for collecting the information
needed by TRIPLEAGENT to evaluate the system’s resilience
capabilities. The perturbation agent injects exceptions into
the application in order to trigger its error-handling logic.
The failure-oblivious agent tries to improve the application’s
resilience by catching and silencing exceptions before they are
handled by default exception handling methods.
All the agents are controlled by a controller which makes
two kinds of decisions: 1) given an application under some
specific workload, which perturbation point should be acti-
vated, 2) whether the point’s corresponding failure-oblivious
method should be switched on. Finally, the controller generates
a report for the developer based on data gathered from a series
of fault injection experiments.
1) Monitoring agent: In order to study the influence of
perturbations and evaluate all possible failure-oblivious meth-
ods in a software system, it is necessary to collect different
kinds of monitoring information. For this, we propose to use
a monitoring agent that is attached to the runtime process.
Our monitoring agent works as follows. For each method
in the code loaded in the JVM, the agent collects static and
dynamic information.
The static information is: 1) its position in the code, 2)
whether it declares checked exceptions to be thrown.
The collected dynamic information is: 3) the number of
method executions over an fault injection experiment, 4) each
time an exception is caught, the agent collects the stack
information, including the stack distance between the method
raising the exception and the method catching it. This includes
both exceptions caught in default exception handlers and in
failure-oblivious methods (as defined in Section III-A).
The TRIPLEAGENT monitoring agent also collects the fol-
lowing information:
• The set of classes that have been loaded into the JVM.
• Whether the application has exited normally or crashed
due to an unhandled exception.
2) Perturbation agent: The perturbation agent injects spe-
cific perturbations at a specific point in time. The perturbation
commands come from the agent controller.
The perturbation agent detects every method with a throws
keyword and attaches itself into this method by rewriting the
bytecode. In order to explore the entire perturbation search
space, the agent injects different perturbation points before
each statement in the method. In this way, the agent is able to
throw such an exception anywhere in the method and compare
the difference.
1 // a perturbation point in Class1
2 void exampleMethod() throws ExceptionA, ExceptionB {
3 // code injected with code transformation
4 PAgent.throwExceptionPerturbation(key1);
5 PAgent.throwExceptionPerturbation(key2);
6 // a statement
7 PAgent.throwExceptionPerturbation(key3);
8 PAgent.throwExceptionPerturbation(key4);
9 }
Listing 1. The Perturbation Strategy in TRIPLEAGENT
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Fig. 1. The components of TRIPLEAGENT
Listing 1 gives an example of how this perturbation agent
works. When a method like exampleMethod() throws multiple
exceptions, corresponding perturbation points are automati-
cally injected with code transformation. The perturbation agent
controls every perturbation point separately. When a specific
point is activated, it throws an exception at the beginning of
the method.
3) Failure-oblivious agent: The failure-oblivious agent in-
struments the code with try-catch blocks during a fault injec-
tion experiment. For reasoning about resilience with respect
to uncaught exceptions, the failure-oblivious agent injects a
try-catch wrapper in all methods. Basically, the whole method
body is wrapped with a try-catch block which handles all types
of exceptions (catch Exception in Java). By default, the
catch block simply throws again the exception which makes it
semantically equivalent to the original code. When the failure-
oblivious method is activated, the injected catch block silences
the exception and prevents it from propagating (note that the
exception may come from this method or from other methods
transitively called from this method).
When an exception is caught by the injected catch block,
there are three possible outcomes: 1) the application runs
normally; 2) the application runs in a gracefully degraded
mode; 3) the application crashes.
1 // a candidate failure-oblivious method in Class2
2 void callExampleMethod() throws ExceptionA,
ExceptionB {
3 try {
4 new Class1().exampleMethod();
5 } catch (Exception a) {
6 if (!FOAgent.modeIsOn(key2)) {
7 throw a;
8 } else { // nothing, the exception is silenced }
9 }
10 }
Listing 2. Automated Code Instrumentation for Identifying Failure-oblivious
Methods in TRIPLEAGENT
Listing 2 illustrates how this is done. In method
callExampleMethod, exampleMethod is invoked. The
failure-oblivious agent detects it as a possible failure-oblivious
method. So the whole method body of callExampleMethod
is wrapped with a try catch block. When the agent controller
activates this failure-oblivious method, it silences all excep-
tions coming from exampleMethod. Otherwise it throws the
caught exception so that it is propagated as usual.
4) Agents controller: The agent controller is responsible
for conducting a series of experiments (see Section III-A).
It controls every agent and gathers all the information to
analyze the system resilience. Additionally, the controller is
configurable. For example, developers can define a filter to
focus on resilience improvement for a specific package.
E. Implementation
There are different kinds of agents in the JVM. The moni-
toring agent is implemented on top of the JVM Tool Interface
(JVMTI) 2. The perturbation agent and failure-oblivious agent
are implemented as JVM agents, using the ASM library
for binary code transformation 3. The agents controller is a
standalone service, it communicates with the JVM and the
agents through local files.
For sake of open-science, the code is made publicly avail-
able at http://bit.ly/tripleagent-repo.
IV. EVALUATION
For evaluating this contribution, we apply a case-based eval-
uation methodology: this methodology consists of an in-depth
analysis of relevant cases selected in a principled way [11]. In
our research domain, it has been shown appropriate in Rinard
et al’s original paper on failure-oblivious computing [30].
We select two case studies according to the following
three criteria: 1) the case should be a real-world application
(i.e., not a toy example) 2) it should be medium-sized in
order to be appropriate for the computing power available
in the laboratory 3) it is possible to define a production-
like workload. Those criteria yield two cases: TTorrent and
HedWig. TTorrent is a file transferring tool which implements
the BitTorrent protocol. HedWig is an email server for the
IMAP, SMTP and POP3 protocols. They are also exemplary
of applications with high resilience requirements: an email
server must not crash, a file download on the dynamic internet
must succeed regardless of unexpected network events, peer
failures, or local machine issues.
The analysis of TRIPLEAGENT requires several executions.
For each perturbation point, its classification requires 2 execu-
tions under the workload (as discussed in Algorithm 2). For
2See https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/platform/jvmti/jvmti.html
3See http://asm.ow2.org
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Fig. 2. Category of Perturbation Points after 2092 Fault Injection Experiments
on TTorrent
each candidate failure-oblivious method, its evaluation also
needs 2 executions under the workload (see Algorithm 3).
For both cases, an execution takes no more than 1 minute
in our testing environment. In total, the cost of the exper-
iments presented in this section is upper-bounded by 2 ×
1 × (1046 + 2844 + 372 + 722) = 9968 minutes. Note that
some experiments lead applications to a crash. It actually takes
TRIPLEAGENT around 3 days to finish all the experiments.
A. Evaluation on TTorrent
1) Experiment Protocol: We apply Section III-C to TTor-
rent, version 2.0.
The workload W for TTorrent consists of downloading a
large file (debian-9.9.0-amd64-netinst.iso, a Debian distribu-
tion installer of 292.0MB). Since BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer
protocol, this workload involves other machines on the internet
which serve (aka "seed") the file. To that extent, the workload
is a production one. We perform a series of fault injection
experiments, as described in Section III-A.
For TTorrent, we consider the following definition of
acceptable behaviour to evaluate candidate failure-oblivious
methods: the behaviour is considered acceptable if an end-user
can successfully download a file with a correct checksum.
2) Experimental Results: Per Section III-C, the first step of
TRIPLEAGENT is to execute TTorrent normally and to monitor
all possible perturbation points. It detects 1046 points in total
within the package com/turn/ttorrent.
Then, TRIPLEAGENT performs two series of experiments:
1) it injects one exception per perturbation point and compares
the behaviour between these experiments and the normal
execution, 2) it always injects exceptions when a perturbation
point is reached and also compares the behaviour against the
reference one.
As a result, all perturbation points get classified in the
3 categories defined in Section III. In total, TRIPLEAGENT
identifies 642 fragile points, 296 sensitive points and 108
immunized points. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these
perturbation points, which are used as a base line for the
following experiments.
The next step of TRIPLEAGENT’s main algorithm is to
compute and assess the possible failure-oblivious methods.
As explained in Algorithm 3, for a perturbation point, a set
of failure-oblivious methods is identified. In our experiment,
TRIPLEAGENT detects 2844 possible failure-oblivious meth-
ods, summed over all the perturbation points. The minimum,
median and maximum number of candidate failure-oblivious
methods per perturbation point is respectively 0, 2, 10.
a) Fragile stays fragile, b) Fragile to sensitive, c) Fragile to immunized
d) Sensitive stays sensitive, e) Sensitive to immunized, f) Immunized stays immunized
Fig. 3. Resilience Improvement on TTorrent: Fragile points, sensitive points
and immunized points are respectively shown in blue, orange and green. The
area of bubbles are corresponding to the numbers of perturbation points under
consideration.
Then, 2844 × 2 = 5688 executions are made to assess
the failure-obliviousness of the candidate points (one per
injection mode). Hopefully, the added catch blocks inserted by
TRIPLEAGENT will increase the number of immunized points.
Let us now consider Figure 3. The fragile, sensitive and
immunized perturbation points are respectively shown in blue,
orange and green. The area of bubbles corresponds to the num-
bers of perturbation points under consideration. For example,
the bubble e represents the 155 sensitive points transformed
into immunized ones with failure-oblivious computing. Over-
all, TRIPLEAGENT successfully transforms 13 fragile points
into sensitive ones, 70 fragile points into immunized ones
and 155 sensitive points into immunized ones. The original
108 immunized points remain immunized. This means that
resilience of the TTorrent has been automatically improved.
Table I presents a sample of perturbation points. Every row
describes 1) a perturbation point (the class name, method
name and its line number), the thrown exception type, and the
corresponding default exception handler written by developers;
2) the failure-oblivious improvement (failure-oblivious method
and concrete change of the perturbation point’s category). For
example, row 1 and row 2 show that TRIPLEAGENT verifies
failure-oblivious methods which improve the original fragile
perturbation points into sensitive ones. Row 7 and row 8
also describe the case that TRIPLEAGENT is able to detect
multiple failure-oblivious methods for the same perturbation
point. For original immunized perturbation points, alternative
failure-oblivious methods which provide the same resilience
are verified as well, which is shown in the last two rows.
3) Case Studies: In the following, we detail 3 case studies
where the resilience is improved.
1 void send(PeerMsg m) throws IllegalStateException {
2 if (this.isConnected()) {
3 ...
4 } else {
5 // perturbation point here
6 unbind(true);
7 }
8 ...
9 }
Listing 3. IllegalStateException in SharingPeer/send
a) Failure-oblivious Method as Alternative to Normal
Resilience: First, Listing 3 shows a failure-oblivious method
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0 Perturbation Point Exception Type Default Handling Method Failure-oblivious Method Improvement
1 BEValue/getNumber@122 InvalidBEnException ClientMain/main BEValue/getLong fragile - sensitive
2 HTTPTrackerC/encodeAnnoToURL@187 AnnoException TrackerClient/annoAllInterfaces HTTPTrackerC/announce fragile - sensitive
3 CommuManager/addTorrent@229 IOException ClientMain/main CommuManager/addTorrent fragile - immunized
4 TorrentParser/getStringOrNull@121 InvalidBEnException ClientMain/main TorrentParser/getStringOrNull fragile - immunized
5 HTTPTrackerC/sendAnnounce@235 ConnectException HTTPTrackerClient/announce HTTPTrackerC/sendAnnounce fragile - immunized
6 SharedTorrent/init@226 InterruptedException SharedTorrent/initIfNecessary SharedTorrent/init sensitive - immunized
7 SharedTor/handlePieceCompleted@671 IOException SharingPeer/handleMessage SharedTor/handlePieceCompleted sensitive - immunized
8 SharedTor/handlePieceCompleted@671 IOException SharingPeer/handleMessage SharingPeer/firePieceCompleted sensitive - immunized
9 WorkingReceiver/processAndGetNext@64 IOException ConnWorker/processSelectedKeys ReadableKeyProcessor/process sensitive - immunized
10 SharingPeer/send@352 IllegalStateException CommuManager/validatePieceAsync SharingPeer/send alternative resilient method
11 PeerMessage/parse@176 ParseException ConnWorker/processSelectedKeys PeerMessage/parse alternative resilient method
TABLE I
SAMPLE OF PERTURBATION POINTS AND THE CORRESPONDING FAILURE-OBLIVIOUSMETHODS IN TTORRENT
with respect to exception IllegalStateException. This
method is executed only 1 time during normal download of the
file. Under perturbation, TRIPLEAGENT identifies that if one
single exception is thrown from this method, the application
is still able to download the file correctly. By analyzing
the stack, TRIPLEAGENT detects another two methods as
candidate failure-oblivious methods: SharingPeer/send
and SharingPeer/notInteresting.
By activating a failure-oblivious try-catch block in these two
methods (i.e. the method body is wrapped with a try-catch
block which blocks the exception), TTorrent still succeeds in
downloading the file. It means that TRIPLEAGENT success-
fully detects 2 alternative methods in the stack that provide the
same resilience as the original manually-written catch block.
1 DataProcessor processAndGetNext(ByteChannel sc)
throws IOException {
2 ...
3 // perturbation point here
4 if (this.pstrLength > MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE) {
5 return new ShutdownAndRemovePeerProcessor(...).
processAndGetNext(socketChannel);
6 }
7 }
Listing 4. IOException in WorkingReceiver/processAndGetNext
b) Improving Resilience under a High Number of Ex-
ceptions: Listing 4 shows method processAndGetNext in
class WorkingReceiver. This method is executed 34304
times during the reference execution. If TRIPLEAGENT injects
one single exception in this method when it is called for the
first time, the application still downloads the file correctly.
However, when the perturbation agent keeping injecting excep-
tions when downloading the file, the application gets stalled.
After analyzing the call stack, TRIPLEAGENT
detects 4 candidate failure-oblivious methods, namely
WorkingReceiver/processAndGetNext,
OutgoingConnectionListener/onNewDataAvail,
ReadableKeyProcessor/process and
ConnectionWorker/processSelectedKey. After
two fault injection experiments per candidate failure-oblivious
method, TRIPLEAGENT observes that the last three methods
are failure-oblivious, the application downloads the file
successfully, no matter how many exceptions are thrown in
processAndGetNext.
In this case, TRIPLEAGENT succeeds in detecting 3 failure-
oblivious methods that provide better resilience compared to
the normal error-handling code written by the developer.
1 String getStringOrNull(Map<...> m, String k) throws
InvalidBEncodingException {
2 // perturbation point here
3 BEValue v = dictionaryMetadata.get(key);
4 if (v == null) return null;
5 return v.getString();
6 }
Listing 5. InvalidBEncodingException in TorrentParser/getStringOrNull
c) Improving Resilience from Crashing to Resilient:
Let now us consider Listing 5. With a fault injection
experiment in method getStringOrNull before
line 3, TRIPLEAGENT identifies that an exception
InvalidBEncodingException thrown at this location
crashes the whole process. Hence, the perturbation point
is a fragile one. After analyzing the stack information,
ClientMain/main is the default handling method. There
are 7 methods including getStringOrNull itself before
this default handling method, which are all considered as
candidate failure-oblivious methods by TRIPLEAGENT.
Then, TRIPLEAGENT performs 2 fault injection experiments
for each method according to Algorithm 3, that is 2× 7 = 14
experiments in total. The first experiment assesses whether
the candidate failure-oblivious methods could handle only one
injected exception. The second assesses whether they could
handle as many as injected exceptions. Indeed, TRIPLEAGENT
observes that when a catch block is automatically injected
in getStringOrNull, the application does not crash any-
more, and even better, the resulting behaviour is correct (the
file is correctly downloaded, its content is the expected one,
bit-per-bit). In this case, TRIPLEAGENT has automatically
transformed a crashing exception into acceptable behaviour.
Insights from the TTorrent experiment
Under a realistic workload of downloading a 200MB+ file
from the internet, TRIPLEAGENT performs 7780 exper-
iments to evaluate 1046 perturbation points spread over
6.5kLOC. TRIPLEAGENT identifies 642 fragile points,
296 sensitive points and 108 immunized points. After
analyzing all 2844 candidate failure-oblivious methods,
TRIPLEAGENT confirms that there are 238 failure-oblivious
methods in the application. This shows that it is feasible to
automatically improve resilience by combining perturbation
injection and failure-obliviousness analysis.
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Fig. 4. Category of Perturbation Points under 744 Fault Injection Experiments
on HedWig
B. Evaluation on HedWig
1) Experiment Protocol: HedWig is an email server written
in Java, a typical server side application. The main process
of HedWig is a perpetual loop, which creates sub-threads to
handle different user requests. HedWig relies on a MySql
database to store email metadata and saves the email contents
as files on the disk. In this experiment, we consider the latest
version of HedWig (v0.7).
The considered workload is as follows. First, HedWig is
deployed on a server. Then TRIPLEAGENT sends a specific
email with a unique content to a testing email address using
the SMTP protocol. Finally, TRIPLEAGENT logs in with the
corresponding account and fetches the same email to do the
comparison. The acceptable behaviour is that TRIPLEAGENT
both successfully sends and fetches the email, and that the
content of this email after final fetching is totally correct.
The experiments are performed sequentially. We note that
some of the perturbation experiments crash the email server.
In this case, the server is automatically restarted. Some per-
turbation experiments put it in a corrupted state: to detect this,
TRIPLEAGENT adds a checking point after each experiment.
All the perturbation agents are switched off and an email is
sent and fetched as usual. If the server works correctly the next
experiment goes on, otherwise TRIPLEAGENT runs a restart
script to bring the server back to normal state.
2) Experimental Results: Within the package
com/hs/mail TRIPLEAGENT detects 372 perturbation
points. Each perturbation point is evaluated by two fault
injection experiments: 1) only one exception is injected during
the email sending and fetching process, when the point is
reached for the first time and 2) exceptions are always injected
when the point is reached. Based on these 744 experiments
TRIPLEAGENT classifies all the perturbation points using the
classification algorithm described in Algorithm 2. Overall,
TRIPLEAGENT finds in Hedwig 264 fragile points, 14
sensitive points and 94 immunized points, which are shown
in Figure 4
The next step for TRIPLEAGENT is to identify the candidate
failure-oblivious methods. By summing over all perturbation
points, TRIPLEAGENT detects 722 candidate methods. The
minimum, median, maximum number of candidate failure-
oblivious methods per perturbation point is respectively 0, 2,
10.
Similar to classifying perturbation points, each candidate
failure-oblivious method also needs two fault injection exper-
a) Fragile stays fragile, b) Fragile to sensitive, c) Fragile to immunized
d) Sensitive stays sensitive, e) Sensitive to immunized, f) Immunized stays immunized
Fig. 5. Resilience Improvement on HedWig
iments to be evaluated. Finally, 1444 executions are made to
evaluate all the candidate failure-oblivious methods based on
Algorithm 3. By silencing exceptions in the candidate failure-
oblivious methods, TRIPLEAGENT shows that 23 fragile per-
turbation points can be improved into sensitive ones. 31 fragile
points are transformed to immunized ones. It upgrades 1
sensitive perturbation point to an immunized one as well. All
those improvements are shown in Figure 5.
Table II shows a sample of interesting perturbation points.
It shows different levels of automatic resilience improvement.
Similar to Table I, every row describes one perturbation point
and one of its corresponding failure-oblivious methods. For
example, the first row gives details about perturbation point
queryForLong in class AbstractDao, line number 100.
When a DataAccessException is thrown from this point,
by default it is handled by a try-catch block written by de-
velopers in TransactionTemplate/execute. But this
catch block does not prevent the exception from failing user
requests. If the same exception is caught earlier in the stack, in
AnsiMessageDao/getHeaderNameID, the server is able
to bear at least one exception. Note that it is possible to have
multiple failure-oblivious methods for the same perturbation
point. Such as row 3 and row 4, row 8 and row 9 in the table.
3) Case Studies: We now discuss two interesting case
studies.
1 mailboxRowMapper = new RowMapper<Mailbox>() {
2 public Mailbox mapRow(ResultSet r, int n) throws
SQLException {
3 // perturbation point here
4 Mailbox mb = new Mailbox();
5 mb.setMailboxID(r.getLong("mailboxid"));
6 ...
7 return mb;
8 }
9 };
Listing 6. SQLException in AnsiMailboxDao$1/mapRow
a) A Failed Failure-oblivious Experiment: Listing 6
shows a perturbation point found by TRIPLEAGENT in Class
AnsiMailboxDao, line 3. First, TRIPLEAGENT detects that
when one SQLException is thrown from this location, the
application fails to receive and send the test email. Hence, the
perturbation point is a fragile one. By analyzing the call stack,
method mapRow is considered as a candidate failure-oblivious
method.
TRIPLEAGENT automatically wraps the method with a try-
catch block. This specific failure-oblivious operation results
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0 Perturbation Point Exception Type Default Handling Method Failure-oblivious Method Category
1 AbstractDao/queryForLong@100 DataAccessException TransactionTemplate/execute AnsiMessageDao/getHeaderNameID fragile - sensitive
2 ImapServerHandler/handleUpstream@56 Exception DCPipeline/sendUpstream ImapServerHandler/handleUpstream fragile - sensitive
3 CountingInputStream/read@21 IOException BodySBuilder/build BodySBuilder/simplePartDescriptor fragile - immunized
4 CountingInputStream/read@21 IOException BodySBuilder/build BodySBuilder/createDescriptor fragile - immunized
5 MessageHeader/parse@118 IOException MessageHeader/<init> MessageHeader/parse fragile - immunized
6 FlagUtils/getFlags@57 SQLException JdbcT/doInPreparedStatement FlagUtils/getFlags fragile - immunized
7 PartContentBuilder/build@63 IOException FetchRespBuilder/bodyContent PartContentBuilder/build fragile - immunized
8 MailMessage/save@88 IOException ToRepository/service MailMessage/save sensitive - immunized
9 MailMessage/save@88 IOException ToRepository/service ToRepository/saveMessage sensitive - immunized
10 AliasingForwarding/service@70 MessagingException LocalDelivery/service AliasingForwarding/service alternative resilient method
11 ToRepository/deliver@118 IOException ToRepository/service ToRepository/deliver alternative resilient method
TABLE II
SAMPLE OF PERTURBATION POINTS AND THE CORRESPONDING FAILURE-OBLIVIOUSMETHODS IN HEDWIG
in inserting an incorrect record into the database, which
influences the upcoming experiments. Thanks to running the
checkpoint procedure described above, TRIPLEAGENT detects
this problem, restarts the server, definitely labels this method
as non failure-oblivious and excludes this perturbation point
for later experiments.
1 public int read() throws IOException {
2 // perturbation point here
3 int next = in.read();
4 ...
5 return next;
6 }
Listing 7. IOException in CountingInputStream/read
b) A Perturbation Point with Multiple Failure-oblivious
Methods: In Listing 7, line 2 is a fragile perturbation point
in Class CountingInputStream. If an IOException
is thrown from this location, the user is not able to
fetch any emails. By default the exception is handled
by BodyStructureBuilder/build(Date d,
Long l), 5 methods upper in the stack. It means
that methods before the default exception handler are
all candidate failure-oblivious methods. TRIPLEAGENT
evaluates them one by one and verifies 3 out of
them. In the call stack, if the exception is silenced in
BodyStructureBuilder/simplePartDescriptor,
BodyStructureBuilder/createDescriptor or
BodyStructureBuilder/build(InputStream i),
the server works properly no matter how many exceptions
are thrown. This is a strong improvement to the resilience.
Insights from the HedWig experiment
Under a production-like email task, TRIPLEAGENT performs
2188 experiments to evaluate 372 perturbation points spread
over 13.8 kLOC. 261 fragile points, 68 sensitive points and
43 immunized points are identified in the original code.
TRIPLEAGENT assesses that 60 out of 722 methods can
be transformed into failure-oblivious methods. This further
confirms that TRIPLEAGENT can improve the resilience of
a server application in an automated manner.
C. Overhead of TRIPLEAGENT
The overhead of TRIPLEAGENT varies a lot among different
perturbation points, failure-oblivious methods. Considering
that the ultimate goal of TRIPLEAGENT is to automati-
cally improve resilience, we manually evaluate the overhead
TABLE III
THE OVERHEAD OF AN EXPERIMENT ON TTORRENT
Evaluation Aspects Original Version Instrumented Version Variation
Downloading time 20.4s 21.1s 3.5%
CPU time 15.0s 18.3 22.2%
Memory usage 47M 49M 4.3%
Peak thread count 30 32 6.7%
Relevant class files size 16.7KB 16.8KB 0.6%
of failure-oblivious experiments. The overhead caused by
TRIPLEAGENT is evaluated in 3 aspects: 1) at the application
level, the execution time is compared. In TTorrent this metric
means the downloading time. In HedWig experiments this
means the time spent on sending and receiving the email. 2)
at the operating system level, the CPU and memory usage,
peak thread count are taken into consideration. 3) at the binary
code level, the code bloat due to instrumentation is evaluated.
For statistical purposes, we conduct the same measurement 30
times and calculate the average [1].
For TTorrent experiments, Table III records the
overhead of verifying failure-oblivious method
HTTPTrackerClient/sendAnnounce in Table I,
row 5. For HedWig experiments, failure-oblivious method
BodySBuilder/simplePartDescriptor in Table II,
row 3 is taken as an example. The overhead of execution
time, CPU time, memory usage, peak thread count, relevant
class files size are respectively 0%, 6.0%, 0%, 5.4%, 3.0%.
The reason why TRIPLEAGENT has such a low overhead
is that the instrumentation is small. The perturbation agent
and failure-oblivious agent only instrumented one or two class
files. Meanwhile, the monitoring agent does not cause high
overhead thanks to the JVMTI framework. By evaluating the
overhead, developers are more confident about the resilience
improvement suggested by TRIPLEAGENT.
V. DISCUSSION
Fault model. Currently TRIPLEAGENT considers two fault
models. In both models, exceptions are injected at a single
location. But there also exists common mode failures which
involve a series of different exceptions. An exception could
also be mixed with data errors. Devising and implementing
fault models that stimulate common mode failures or data
errors is an interesting direction for future work.
Workload impact. A threat to the validity of our exper-
iments comes from the workload. TRIPLEAGENT takes a
production-like workload to exercise the application code.
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When TRIPLEAGENT identifies a failure-oblivious method, it
guarantees that it works under the tested workload. But it may
break some behavior with a more comprehensive workload.
Overall, the more diverse the workload is, the more confidence
TRIPLEAGENT has in the found failure-oblivious methods.
Scalability. During our experiments, the deepest call stack
considered was composed of 39 methods. TRIPLEAGENT has
not been tested with larger applications with deeper stacks. As
such, the full scalability of TRIPLEAGENT is not yet verified.
We note that the number of candidate failure-oblivious meth-
ods to assess is linear in the depth of the stack, which means
that, in theory, TRIPLEAGENT would be scalable.
VI. RELATED WORK
Now we discuss the related work along three aspects.
1) Fault injection: Fault injection is a widely-researched
topic in software dependability. In the 1990s, the research was
mostly about hardware implemented fault injection tools. For
example, Madeira et al. [21] invented RIFLE, a pin-level fault
injector to generate processor errors. Next, more software-
based fault injection tools were invented. Kanawati et al. [18]
proposed FERRARI, a tool for the emulation of hardware
faults and control flow errors. Han et al. [16] designed
DOCTOR, a tool for injecting hardware failures and network
communication failures. Wei et al. [35] built a software-
based hardware faults injector called LLFI, and quantitatively
compared the accuracy of fault-injection with assembly code
level injector PINFI. Lee et al. [20] presented SFIDA, a tool
to test the dependability of distributed applications on the
Linux platform. Kao et al. [19] invented “FINE”, a fault
injection and monitoring tool to inject both hardware-induced
software errors and software faults. Kouwe and Tanenbaum
[34] presented HSFI, a fault injection tool that injects faults
with context information from source code and applies fault
injection decisions efficiently on the binary.
Fu et al. [12] presented an approach to measure the coverage
of recovery code with respect to operating system and I/O
hardware faults. The common idea with TRIPLEAGENT is to
inject exceptions to trigger error handling code. Yet, our and
their goal are notably different. Fu el al. use fault injection
to increase recovery code coverage. TRIPLEAGENT combines
fault injection with failure-oblivious computing to improve
resilience.
The novelty of TRIPLEAGENT is that it is designed to
inject application-level exceptions (and not hardware faults)
in Java applications. TRIPLEAGENT gives developers concrete
insights at the source code level about their exception-handling
implementation.
2) Self-healing software: Self-healing software follows the
idea that it is possible to automatically make software re-
cover from failures. Different techniques have been applied to
achieve this goal, such as automatic reboot, checkpoint-restart,
and failure-oblivious transformation.
Reboot techniques [4], [17], [33] require the system to be
able to restart, which may bring some down-time. Checkpoint-
restart techniques significantly reduce the recovery time by
saving and reloading runtime states saved at checkpoints. Qin
et al. [27] invented Rx, which enables the program to rollback
to a recent checkpoint upon a software failure, and then to
re-execute in a modified environment. Sidiroglou et al. [31]
proposed ASSURE, a system that introduces rescue points to
recover from unknown faults.
Regarding failure-oblivious computing, Rinard et al. [30]
invented a safe compiler for C to enable servers to execute
despite memory errors. Perkins et al. [26] proposed ClearView,
a system for automatically patching errors in deployed soft-
ware. It observes values of registers and memory locations
and tries to detect violations of invariants at this level. Rigger
et al. [28] presented an approach that allows C programmers
to perform explicit sanity checks and to react according to
invalid arguments or states. They also designed a C dialect
called Lenient C [29] that checks undefined behaviours in the
C standard including memory management, pointer operations
and arithmetic operations.
None of these tools combine fault injection and failure-
oblivious computing together as we do in TRIPLEAGENT.
They do not actively inject failures into the system, nor do they
conduct application-level analysis to detect valuable failure-
oblivious positions.
3) Exception analysis: Byeong-Mo et al. [5] gave a com-
prehensive review on exception analysis. Magiel Bruntink et
al. [3] proposed a characterization and evaluation method to
statically discover faults in exception handling. Fu and Ryder
[13] described a static analysis method for exception chains
in Java. Martins et al. [22] presented VerifyEx to test Java
exceptions by inserting exceptions at the beginning of try
blocks. Zhang and Elbaum [37] presented an approach that
amplifies tests to validate exception handling. Cornu et al. [7]
proposed a classification of try-catch blocks at testing time.
Those tools rely on test suites to analyze resilience with
respect to error-handling. On the contrary, TRIPLEAGENT
analyzes the system behaviour based on user-level traffic and
usages.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented TRIPLEAGENT, a system
which combines automated monitoring, automated perturba-
tion injection and automated resilience improvement. By eval-
uating TRIPLEAGENT on two real-world Java applications, we
have shown that it is able to detect weaknesses in exception-
handling of Java code and to improve resilience. In the future,
we will further explore the design space of perturbation and
failure-obliviousness strategies. For instance, we would like
to inject timeout on requests and interactions in asynchronous
software. Our long-term goal is to use TRIPLEAGENT in
production, and consequently, we will also keep reducing the
overhead of TRIPLEAGENT at runtime.
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